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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

judgment the present defendants contended that the plaintiff's election to proceed against the automobile negligence defendants in the
original action precluded the present action and that the discharge
of prior defendants by satisfaction of judgment discharged the
present defendants.
The primary and critical finding of the court was that the
present defendants and prior defendants were not joint but successive tort-feasorers. Through this finding the court distinguished
McTigue v. Levy,40 relied upon by the defendants. In a true joint
tort-feasor situation, a satisfaction of judgment recovered against
one joint tort-feasor discharges all joint tort-feasors.
The court then addressed itself to a determination of whether
plaintiff's attempt to recover against the malpractice defendants
would violate the rule barring a double satisfaction for a single
injury. The court stated that the word satisfaction contemplates
full and total compensation for the injuries suffered. When plaintiff
accepted what he could get from the judgment debtor and the
debtor's carrier he was merely getting part payment on account of
his injuries.
The court recognized that Milks v. Mclver,50 from the Court of
Appeals, holds that a general release given to the original wrongdoer bars action against the negligent physician who aggravates the
damages. However, in Milks, the release given to the original
wrongdoer was clearly with a view to cover both original and
aggravated injuries. In the instant case, the malpractice action
was pending when the satisfaction of judgment was given for an
amount much less than that of the judgment. Thus, the contention that it was intended to cover all the injuries was negated.51
ARTICLE

30-

REmEDIES AND PLEADING

CPLR 3012.: Court dismisses plaintiff's action because of false
affidavit.
In DiRusso v. Kravitz,52 plaintiff served a summons without a
complaint. After plaintiff failed to comply with defendant's demand
for a complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3012(b), defendant moved to
dismiss. The plaintiff then interposed an affidavit stating that he
was unable to serve a complaint because of ill health. The court
accepted this excuse and denied defendant's motion.
App. Div. 928, 23 N.Y.S2d 114 (2d Dep't 1940).
50264 N.Y. 267 (1934).

40260

.' See, e.g., Rask v. County of Nassau, 24 App. Div. 2d 580, 262 N.Y.S.2d
56 (2d Dep't 1965).
5227 App. Div. 2d 926, 279 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1st Dep't 1967), aff'd, 21
N.Y.2d 1008, 238 N.E.2d 329, 290 N.Y.S2d 928 (1968).
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During trial it was established that the plaintiff had falsified
his affidavit. He had not been ill, but rather had been actively
seeking to procure a barber's license. Defendant's renewal motion
to dismiss was denied by the trial court, but, the appellate division
reversed and granted the motion nunc pro tunc on the ground that
the plaintiff's lie had deprived the defendant of the relief he should
have originally received.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's conclusion noting that, since an honest man would originally have been
thrown out
of court, a failure to dismiss would put a premium on
53
perjury.
CPLR 3025(c).: Infant plaintiff permitted to amend ad damnum
after verdict.
CPLR 3025(c) allows a court to permit amendment of pleadings, before or after judgment, on such terms as may be just, so
as to conform them to the evidence. CPLR 3017 allows a court
to grant any type of relief within its jurisdiction appropriate to the
proof whether or not demanded. It would seem that these sections
54
would permit recovery beyond a complaint's ad damnum clause.
However, it has long been established in New York that a plaintiff's recovery is limited to the amount of damages sought in his
complaint. 55
An exception to this rule has been created by Naujokas v.
H. Frank Carey High School. 6 Infant plaintiff sustained severe
injuries in an accident on a school trampoline and demanded $50,000
in damages. After a jury returned a verdict for five times that
amount, the court permitted the plaintiff to increase the amount of
damages sought in the ad damnum clause. The court based its decision on the fact that defendant would not be prejudiced and that
the rights of an infant were involved. Emphasizing that an infant
is considered a ward of the court, whose rights cannot be lost
through the negligence, mistake or inadvertence of his guardian ad
litem or attorney, the court cited previous instances of judicial

53See 7B

McKINNEY's CPLR 3012, supp. commentary 72 (1968).
54In Riggs, Ferris & Greer v. Lillibridge, 316 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1963),

the court so construed the then soon to be enacted CPLR. But see 3
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3017.06 (1965); FIRsT

REP. 68.
55
See, e.g., Michalowski v. Ey, 7 N.Y.2d 71, 163 N.E.2d 863, 195
N.Y.S.2d 633 (1959); Garden Hill Estates, Inc. v. Bernstein, 24 App.
Div. 2d 512, 261 N.Y.S.2d 648 (2d Dep't 1965); Silbert v. Silbert, 22 App.
Div. 2d 893, 255 N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1964).
so 57 Misc. 2d 175, 292 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968).

